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Understanding the organization of R&D activities requires the simultaneous consideration of scientific
workers' talent and tastes, companies' organizational choices, and the characteristics of the relevant
industry. We develop a model of the provision of incentives to corporate scientists, in an environment
where (1) scientists engage in multiple activities when performing research; (2) knowledge is not perfectly
appropriable; (3) scientists are responsive to both monetary and non-monetary incentives; and (4) firms
compete on the product market. We show that both the degree of knowledge spillovers and of market
competition affect the incentives given to scientists, and these effects interact. First, high knowledge
spillovers lead firms to soften incentives when product market competition is high, and to strengthen
incentives when competition is low. Second, the relationship between the intensity of competition
and the power of incentives is U-shaped, with the exact shape depending on the degree of knowledge
spillovers. We also show that the performance-contingent pay for both applied and basic research increases
with the non-pecuniary benefits that scientists obtain from research. We relate our findings to the existing
empirical research, and also discuss their implications for management and public policy.
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The management of scientiﬁc workers and the design of eﬀective incentives for them are considered
key determinants of competitive success,1 but present numerous challenges for companies. A major
organizational decision concerns whether to provide high-powered incentives based on the scientists’
performance, or to soften incentives instead and let the researchers’ quest for reputation drive their
eﬀort. Another diﬃculty is how to measure performance in the ﬁrst place, since research is a
complex activity with no necessarily immediate returns (Holmstrom, 1989). A further set of issues
concerns how the characteristics of the markets where a company operates, and in particular the
level of competition and knowledge appropriability, aﬀect the type and strength of incentives.
Understanding how companies motivate scientiﬁc workers is of importance also for policy makers.
Key industrial policy questions concern how to design competition laws and intellectual property
regimes that elicit incentives to innovate for ﬁrms, and therefore aﬀect the types of incentives
companies oﬀer to their researchers, while not curbing the dissemination of knowledge.
In fact, these issues point to broader challenges for both scholars and practitioners. All major
organizational problems require the considerations of multiple levels of analysis: individual charac-
teristics such as talent and tastes (Sauermann et al., 2010; Stern, 2004); organizational capabilities
and structure, including the incentive system (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Holmstrom, 1989;
Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994); and the characteristics of the relevant industry, in particular the
competitive pressure (Porter, 1980; Raith, 2003; Schmidt, 1997; Turner et al., 2010). While the
importance of all of these dimensions is often recognized, research that tries to integrate them in
one framework is limited.
In this paper, we develop a model to show that not only all of these dimensions aﬀect the deter-
mination of incentives to company scientists, but that these diﬀerent factors interact in interesting
ways. The model is developed in Section 2, and includes four key aspects. First, scientists engage
in multiple, diﬀerent activities (Cockburn et al., 1999). Second, the outcome of research activities,
knowledge, is only imperfectly appropriable (Arrow, 1962; Spence, 1984). Third, while scientists
are responsive to the provision of monetary incentives, they also care about non-material outcomes,
such as their reputation among peers (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Merton, 1973). Fourth, the pro-
vision of incentives to scientists, and to all workers in general, is likely to depend on the conditions
that a ﬁrm faces in the product market, such as the intensity of competition (Raith, 2003; Schmidt,
1997). In the model, two ﬁrms compete in an industry by oﬀering diﬀerentiated products, and de-
sign incentives for their scientists (simpliﬁed to be a single agent per ﬁrm) to invest in cost-reducing
research. Scientists engage in two types of eﬀorts. The ﬁrst kind of eﬀort — which we call applied
(or proprietary) research — does not provide non-pecuniary beneﬁts to the scientists and does not
generate knowledge spillovers to the rival ﬁrm; the second kind of eﬀort — we call it basic (or open)
research — provides non-pecuniary beneﬁts to scientists but spills over to the rival ﬁrm. The ﬁrm’s
1Andersson et al. (2009), Dennis (1987), Garnier (2008), Henderson and Cockburn (1994), Lamoreaux and Sokoloﬀ
(1999), Lerner and Wulf (2006), Sauermann and Cohen (2008), Zucker and Darby (1995).
2owners oﬀer a wage contract to the scientists contingent on observable outcomes. The outcomes
can include, for example, patents and scientiﬁca r t i c l e s .
In Section 3 we discuss the results of the model, characterizing the optimal incentive contract
for the scientists. The ﬁrst set of results highlight how the provision of incentives for basic and
applied research depends not only on the intensity of competition and the degree of knowledge
spillovers, but also crucially on the interaction between these two environmental conditions. High
knowledge spillovers do not necessarily reduce the incentives to perform research: if competition
is low, then ﬁrms provide high-powered incentives for both basic and applied research, since their
dominant position in the product market reduces the negative eﬀects of spillovers while allowing
ﬁrms to enjoy each other’s produced knowledge. With high competition, not only do we derive that
incentives for basic research eﬀort decrease as spillovers become more pervasive; we also show that
it is optimal to mute incentives for applied research eﬀort, even if it does not generate spillovers. In
turn, the impact of product market competition on the strength and direction of R&D incentives
depends on the degree of knowledge spillovers. If knowledge spillovers are low, ﬁrms provide the
strongest incentives for basic and applied research both when they face very little competition
(since cost reduction through R&D has a bigger absolute impact on proﬁt s ) ,a n dw h e nc o m p e t i t i o n
is very high (for competitive pressure makes any small cost reduction a proportionally large one,
because proﬁts are lower). Thus, the relationship between the intensity of competition and the
power of incentives to scientists is U-shaped. In contrast, when there are high levels of spillovers,
the strength of incentives is decreasing in the intensity of competition. A further implication of
these ﬁndings is that incentives for basic and applied research are complementary only if either the
level of product market competition or the degree of spillovers is low.
The second set of results concern the impact of a scientist’s non-monetary motivation to perform
basic research, or taste for science, on her pay scheme. The response of scientists to steeper
incentives is stronger when they also have high intrinsic motives to perform basic research. As a
consequence, companies optimally provide stronger incentives to intrinsically motivated scientists,
both for basic research and applied research, even if the latter does not generate non-monetary
beneﬁts to the scientists. We show, in contrast, that a trade-oﬀ can occur between the ﬁxed
component of pay and non-monetary rewards.
An implication for empirical research is that studies of the determinants of incentives to scien-
tists need to account for such environmental conditions as the degree of product market competition
and of appropriability of knowledge, and need to analyze separately diﬀerent components of wages,
e.g. ﬁxed and contingent pays, since they might respond diﬀerently to certain individual or envi-
ronmental changes. In describing the model’s implications in Section 3, we also interpret a number
of existing empirical studies in the light of our ﬁndings.
The model in this paper is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst one to analyze the eﬀects of product mar-
ket characteristics on incentives for eﬀort (in research activities) where eﬀort is multi-dimensional
and the agents have preferences or tastes for certain activities. The building blocks of the model
3here have been established by an extensive literature; we show that the interaction between these
blocks is crucial for our results. There is, in particular, a vast literature investigating the relation-
ship between competition and managerial eﬃciency (e.g., Raith, 2003; Schmidt, 1997) and between
competition and innovation (among the most recent contributions, see Sacco and Schmutzler, 2009;
Schmutzler, 2010; and Vives, 2008). Baggs and de Bettignies (2007), moreover, link these two
streams of literature by developing a model where they isolate the agency eﬀect of competition
f r o mt h ed i r e c tp r e s s u r ee ﬀect, which is present independent of agency costs. Some papers consider
also the presence of knowledge spillovers in R&D investments (Spence,1984; Qiu,1997).2 We con-
tribute to these studies by showing that the impact of each of these two factors crucially depends
on the other. Furthermore, a few papers have developed principal-agent models where agents are
intrinsically motivated. Murdock (2002) considers a model where agents also have intrinsic moti-
vations for the completion of projects, but the principal may prefer not to implement some of these
projects if they have negative expected ﬁnancial returns. Implicit contracts where the principal
commits to implement the projects preferred by the agent may be socially superior and are more
likely to be chosen by a principal when the agent’s intrinsic motivation is higher (see also Manso,
2010).3 Murdock’s model, therefore, studies the relationship between decision right allocation and
the intrinsic motivation of agents, while our model analyzes the shape of the optimal incentive
contracts as it responds to non-monetary motives of agents. Besley and Ghatak (2005) develop a
model of matching with intrinsically motivated agents and show that monetary and non-monetary
incentives are substitutes. In their model, the reward of the principal is unaﬀected by the agent’s
intrinsic motivation, thus the principal exploits intrinsic motivation to save on the cost of high-
powered incentives. In our model, the taste for science, through its impact on the desire to perform
basic research, directly impacts the principal’s payoﬀ, thus leading to complementarity. Finally,
Banal-Estañol and Macho-Stadler (2010) study the time allocation problem among diﬀerent activ-
ities of a researcher who responds to both ﬁnancial and scientiﬁc incentives, and show that higher
ﬁnancial incentives can lead a scientist to opt for riskier projects. Their study, however, abstracts
from the analysis of the impact of knowledge appropriability and product market competition.
Section 4 explores the managerial and policy insights from our results. In highlighting the
interaction between the conditions in the product market and the ease of transmission of knowledge,
our results inform R&D managers on the importance to look at their company’s position in the
product market and at the knowledge appropriability conditions for diﬀerent types of activities
when designing their internal incentive schemes. R&D managers, moreover, need to consider the
diﬀerent degrees of interest for monetary pay and for their reputations of their scientists. Scientists
w h oa r em o r ee a g e rt om a i n t a i n their links to the scientiﬁc community even when employed by a
ﬁrm, and are allowed to do so, are not necessarily "cheap." Instead, these are the scientists who
are given more powerful incentives for the performance of both basic and applied research. As for
2See also De Bondt (1997) for a survey.
3Manso’s model also considers intertemporal research contracts, while we abstract from dynamic considerations.
4public policy, our analysis implies that IP protection rules should be determined in relation to the
level of competition of each industry and that, in particular, antitrust legislation and IP protection
are complementary instruments. For example, in industries where IP protection is very strong,
competition on the product market should be particularly favored.
Section 5, ﬁnally, oﬀers concluding remarks.
2 The Model
In this section, we present the basic structure of our model. We ﬁrst describe the characteristics and
key variables and parameters deﬁning the competitive environment, the incentive system, and the
individual preferences of scientists. We then discuss and motivate in more detail our assumptions.
Finally, we solve the model and determine the optimal incentive scheme for scientists. All proofs
are gathered in the Appendix.
2.1 Setup
The model is built as a four-stage game whose timing is represented in Figure 1 and whose detailed
description follows.
The competitive environment Two ﬁrms, i and j, compete on the market by choosing the
quantity they produce (Cournot competition). The ﬁrms’ objective is to maximize their expected
proﬁts. The inverse demand schedule for the product of ﬁrm  can be represented as follows (the
setup for ﬁrm j is symmetrical to that for ﬁrm i as described here):
 =  −  −  (1)
where  is the price,  is the quantity, and  ∈ [01] is a parameter indicating the intensity of
competition with the rival ﬁrm  The limit case of  =0reﬂects the ﬁrms operating as monopolists
in separate markets. The opposite limit case of  =1represents the highest level of competition
in this setting, with the two rivals supplying homogenous products.4 Firms bear production costs
that can be represented as follows:
 =  (2)
In (2),  stands for total costs. Therefore,  is the marginal cost of production. The marginal
cost can be reduced through the performance of research activities. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrm can hire
a scientist who exerts research eﬀort before competition in the product market occurs. Eﬀort has
two dimensions: applied (
 ) and basic (
 ) research. We assume that eﬀort is unveriﬁable. The
4As shown by Singh and Vives (1984), the demand function in (1) can be obtained by the maximization problem





5marginal cost (and proﬁts) will be unveriﬁable, or non-contractible, too. The relationship between
eﬀort and marginal cost for ﬁrm  is as follows:




where  is a constant and  is in the interval [01] In addition to the eﬀorts of its own scientist,
ﬁrm  can have its marginal costs further reduced by the eﬀort in basic science performed by ﬁrm
, because basic research is not perfectly appropriable and its result can spill over also to ﬁrm who
do not perform it. The size of the parameter  determines the degree of knowledge spillovers.
The incentive scheme In order to compensate the scientist for her (costly, as described below)
eﬀort and to inﬂuence the scientists choice of the type of eﬀort, the ﬁrm oﬀers the scientists a wage
 that takes the form of an incentive contract. The non-contractibility of marginal costs and proﬁts
does not allow the scientist’s wage to be contingent, say, directly on proﬁts.5 The ﬁrm proposes
an incentive contract on other measures that are veriﬁable. We consider two veriﬁable signals,
 and , that are functions, respectively, of  and , and of stochastic shocks. Patents (or
proofs of concept) and academic papers can be considered, as expressed in numbers or value, as
observable measures of the two types of eﬀort, respectively. Large-sample analyses as well as case
studies report that many companies, especially in research-intensive industries, base the incentive
schemes for scientists on direct outcomes of their research activities, let their researchers publish
and, more generally, participate in the activities of their community of peers outside the company’s
(and the industry’s) boundaries, and even reward scientists on the basis of their standing in the
scientiﬁc community (Cockburn et al., 1999; Garnier, 2008; Gittelman and Kogut, 2003; Henderson











 represent random shocks with zero mean. The wage schedule ﬁrm  proposes to







where the variables 0
, 
 and 
 are under the control of the ﬁrm.
The wage contract is oﬀered simultaneously by the two ﬁrms to their own scientist, before eﬀort
is provided, and the scientist is paid at the realization of the performance measures, which can be
assumed to occur before the ﬁrms compete on the market.
5The non-contractibility of costs and proﬁts can be considered as a natural assumption especially in the context
of small, entrepreneurial ﬁrms, where monitoring costs are high and most ﬁnancial information is not public. In
addition, we model costs as a deterministic function of eﬀorts. An alternative formulation would be to model costs as
random functions of eﬀorts, while assuming they are contractible, as in Raith (2003). In this case, we could consider
also contracts contingent on proﬁts as in Hart (1983). Alternatively, one could include in the model the choice of the
observables on which to base the contract, as in Piccolo et al. (2008).
6The individual preferences The (risk-neutral) scientists derive utility both from monetary
rewards, and from the possibility to engage in basic research activities. In addition to caring about
money, scientists therefore have a "taste for science." Eﬀort costs are quadratic and separable. The
utility function of a scientist hired by ﬁrm  is:












where 0 is the degree of taste for science and 0 is a parameter inversely related to the
productivity of applied and basic research. The scientist’s reservation utility is denoted with 
2.2 A discussion of the model’s structure
Before we solve the model, some observations on its assumptions and robustness to alternative spec-
iﬁcations are in order. First, in the model ﬁrms compete à la Cournot. An alternative speciﬁcation
would consider Bertrand competition; this raises the question of whether price competition would
lead to diﬀerent results. We have, in fact, analyzed a version of the model with price competition.
The results, available upon request, can be summarized as follows. Cournot competition is con-
ducive to higher applied and basic research than Bertrand competition, ceteris paribus, consistent
with previous comparisons made for one-dimensional eﬀort (Qiu, 1997). With Cournot competition,
higher investments in R&D make the ﬁrm "tougher" (bigger) in the market and this discourages its
rival’s sales (a strategic eﬀect). With price competition, a ﬁrm’s R&D lowers costs and induces a
rival to cut its price, which is detrimental to both. As a consequence, the type of competition does
aﬀect the level of the incentive piece rates. This diﬀerence notwithstanding, almost none of the
results derived below is qualitatively aﬀected by the type of competition being based on quantity
rather than on price. The only exception is given by relationship between strength of incentives
and intensity of competition; below we show that this relationship can be U-shaped, while it is
unambiguously negative under Bertrand competition (see also Schmutzler, 2010).
Second, in the model, applied and basic research eﬀorts enter linearly and separately into the
production cost function. An alternative speciﬁcation could include an interaction term between
the two eﬀorts, capturing complementarities between applied and basic research. Notice, however,
that the current formulation already induces complementarity between the two types of research,
since an increase in the level of one type of research increases the marginal return from performing
the other type. The intuition for this goes as follows. Consider an exogenous increase in one of two
eﬀorts. This brings about a reduction in costs, which leads a ﬁrm to expand its size; in turn, the
incentive to invest in the other type of eﬀort increases since larger ﬁrms have stronger incentives
in investing in cost-reducing innovation. If an interaction term is included in the production cost
function, this would add an additional source of complementarity between applied and basic research
(of a purely knowledge nature in this case, rather than a strategic one) and would simply expand
the area of the parameter space in which variations in the parameters lead to the same direction
7of change in the piece rates.6
Third, and related to the previous point, also the cost of eﬀort is separable. We opted for
this formulation (as in other studies, such as Baker, 2002; and Gibbons, 2005a) in order to focus
our attention on other determinants of scientiﬁce ﬀorts (and their co-movement), in a framework
where complementarities in types of research emerge from the interaction of ﬁrms in the product
market. Also, simple and tractable formulations of the cost function allowing for interactions
between eﬀorts would produce results, in the context of our model, that do not seem particularly





 If the contract oﬀered
to the scientists is linear, then the scientists would invest only in applied research if    + ,
or in basic research otherwise; this would go against the evidence of ﬁr m si n v e s t i n gi nb o t ht y p e s
of research.
Fourth, we consider scientiﬁce ﬀort as valuable in that it reduces production costs. We are
therefore considering process innovations. However, the model can accommodate some types of
product innovation as well (Vives, 2008). In particular, quality improvements in existing products
can be modeled as an increase in consumers’ willingness to pay for a product. Suppose that the
scientists’ eﬀort, instead of reducing the baseline marginal cost , increases the maximum willingness
to pay  in the demand function (equation (1)). Thus the ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions, and therefore
their optimal contract decisions, will be unaﬀected as compared to the case developed here.7
Fifth, notice that knowledge spillovers, in the model, do not occur directly through publica-
tions or patents. It is implicitly assumed that the ﬁrms can eﬀectively protect their proprietary
knowledge, even when it is made public through either patents or publications. The assumption
is quite obvious as long as patents are concerned, but it is also a plausible choice with respect
to publications: ﬁrms typically delay publications of their scientists (and of independent scien-
tiﬁc partners) until conﬁdential information and intellectual property are secured (Blumenthal et
al., 1986). Knowledge spillovers, however, can still occur through more informal and less veriﬁ-
able channels. These channels include interpersonal relations and conversations among scientists
from diﬀerent organizations, as well as labor mobility. Plausibly, it is harder for a ﬁrm to control
these ﬂows of information.8 The model captures the diﬀerence between "appropriable" and "pure"
knowledge spillovers by having the wage schedule depend on codiﬁed measures, e.g. publications
(see expression (6) above), while knowledge spillovers occur directly through the unveriﬁable (by a
third party) eﬀort (as in the cost function (3)). The model also considers the fact that knowledge
is more likely to be transmitted if it is more basic, thus less ﬁrm-speciﬁc than knowledge from
6A formal analysis of the eﬀect of knowledge complementarities between applied and basic research is available
upon request.
7In contrast, our model cannot accommodate for innovations consisting in both the introduction of new products
and changes in the degree of product diﬀerentiation (and then, the intensity of competition.)
8If spillovers occurred directly through publications and/or patents, it would be interesting to study the ﬁrms’s
disclosure strategies by making the parameter  endogenous. Mukherjee and Stern (2009), for example, consider
the trade-oﬀ between secrecy and disclosure, and ﬁnd that diﬀerent regimes ("Open Science", "Secrecy" or cycles
between the two) can be sustained as equilibria. Gans et al. (2010) assume that knowledge can be disclosed through
patents and/or publications.
8applied research, and that the transmission of knowledge is imperfect. The former fact is captured
by having knowledge spillovers occur only through eﬀort in basic research; the imperfection in the
transmission of knowledge is captured by having , i.e. the share of a scientist’s basic research
eﬀo r tt h a tb e n e ﬁts a rival ﬁrm, within the unit interval. In fact, one could argue that, especially
in some disciplines, such as engineering or computer science, most publishable research is applied
and not basic. Therefore, also this type of research can generate spillovers and also enhance a
scientist’s reputation among peers. An alternative terminology would be to deﬁne  as eﬀort in
"proprietary" research, and  as eﬀort in "open" research. Throughout the paper we will keep
with the applied/basic terminology, but the alternative dichotomy can also be employed.
Related to the previous point, notice that the intensity of knowledge spillovers between compa-
nies is not be related to the intensity of product market competition. Even when product markets
are separated, for instance, the relevant knowledge that allows innovation for one product can be
relevant for the other product. Furthermore, while diﬀerent geographical areas may be isolated
in terms of ﬁnal product competition (e.g. by regulation), researchers can still communicate and
diﬀuse their knowledge through other channels. Conversely, ﬁrms may operate in similar markets
and compete ﬁercely, but use diﬀerent technologies, so that knowledge spillovers are low.9
Finally, we are making two other assumptions on the scientists’s preferences, in addition to the
form of the eﬀort cost function. One assumption is that they are risk-neutral. This makes our setting
equivalent to one where eﬀorts were observable; consequently, the principal-agent framework could
be considered as redundant. However, we preferred to maintain this representation for a number
of reasons. First, some assumptions, e.g. the notion of scientists’ "taste for science," are more
naturally understood in this context. Second, the empirical literature we refer throughout the
paper adopts a principal-agent theoretical framework. Finally, we have indeed analyzed a version
of the model with risk aversion (this analysis is available upon request).10 Although the analysis is
algebraically more cumbersome, our key results are qualitatively the same as in the risk-neutral case.
More generally, the agent’s risk attitude is not at the core of our analysis. While risk aversion has
been traditionally a basic element of principal-agent models, Gibbons (2005b) suggests examples of
recent contributions in agency theory where other aspects (such as multi-task) provide key insights
even with risk neutrality.
The second assumption about the scientists’ preferences is that their utility depends both on
9As an example of research aimed at a given market segment that is relevant for diﬀerent segments, consider the
research for cardiovascular-related diseases that turned out to be useful for the correction of erectile dysfunctions
(Kling, 1998; Pietsch, 2006). Similarly, airplane producers and automakers, or computer and cellphone manufacturers,
use similar technologies but do not operate in the same markets (Bloom et al., 2008). Alcacer and Zhao (2007) and
Bloom et al. (2008), moreover, document that ﬁrms that compete with each other may employ diﬀerent technologies.
10In the extension, the change with respect to the model presented here is in the scientists’ utility func-
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9monetary returns and on a taste for science, and in particular basic research. This assumption is
in line with a vast literature on the direct beneﬁts (psychological and social) that scientists derive
from performing activities that advance knowledge and are recognized in the community of peers
— features that characterize basic, open science (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Merton, 1973; Roach
and Sauermann, 2010). In other words, scientists have both extrinsic and intrinsic motivations.
A recurrent theme in the literature on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (Frey, 1997) is related
to the "crowding out" eﬀect, i.e. the idea that extrinsic motivation (in our case, high-powered
incentives) would undermine intrinsic motivation (in our case, the taste for science). We rule out
this possibility, by assuming that the monetary and non-monetary component of the utility function
are independent — as we will see below, despite the "technical" independence, explicit and implicit
rewards are complementary in our model. Bénabou and Tirole (2003) develop a model where
" c r o w d i n go u t "e ﬀects are likely to occur when a principal has private information about the task
or the agent’s characteristics, and the agent infers such information from the principal’s behavior.
These conditions do not seem to ﬁto u rc a s e .
2.3 Deriving the optimal incentive scheme
The model is solved by backward induction, starting from the quantity choices in the product
market. The focus is on ﬁrm .T h er e s u l t sf o rﬁrm  are easily obtained.
2.3.1 Market competition
Firm  maximizes its proﬁt by solving the following problem:


Π =(  − ) =(  −  −  − ) (8)
Considering that the problem for ﬁrm  is symmetric, and solving for the (necessary and suﬃcient)



















2.3.2 The scientist’s eﬀort choice
The eﬀort choices of scientist  are straightforward to obtain, given the incentive scheme and the
taste for science. They are increasing in the piece rates, and eﬀort in basic science is also increasing
in the degree of taste for science. Both eﬀorts are decreasing in the diﬃculty of the tasks as













2.3.3 The principal’s incentive provision problem
Following Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), the principal’s choice of the optimal contract is obtained
from maximizing the expected total surplus , subject to the incentive compatibility constraints,
g i v e nb yt h es c i e n t i s t ’ so p t i m a le ﬀort choices. This deﬁnes a constrained maximization problem





















 (11) and (12).
This lead to our ﬁrst proposition that derives the incentive piece rates 
 and 
 (the subscript
 stands for "Equilibrium"), symmetric for the two ﬁrms.










2[(−)+(1 + )](2 − )
− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )
 (15)
where  ≡ ( +2 ) 2(2 − ).T h eﬁxed component of wage 0
 is set so as the scientists obtain
their reservation utility 
From expressions (14) and (15), a series of comparative statics can be performed. These ex-
periments are the subject of the following Section, where we study the impact of competition,
knowledge spillovers and taste for science on the strength, direction and complementarity of incen-
tive mechanisms.
3 Implications: the impact of competition, knowledge spillovers,
and non-monetary motives on the optimal incentive contract
The implications of the model are analyzed in two parts. In the ﬁrst part, we study how knowledge
spillovers and the intensity of competition aﬀect the relative and absolute strength of incentives,
and we determine the competitive and knowledge-appropriability conditions under which the two
11incentive rates are complementary. In the second part, we focus on how the presence of non-
monetary motives for basic research aﬀects the deﬁnition of the incentive contract. The propositions
presented below are preceded by an informal description of, and the intuitions behind the results.
Each of the two subsections also include a discussion of how the model helps to interpret the existing
empirical evidence on the provision of incentives to corporate scientists.
3.1 Competition, Spillovers, and Incentives
3.1.1 The relative strength of incentives
The higher the competitive pressure on the product market and the higher the ease with which
knowledge spills over to competitors, the stronger the incentives to perform applied research in
comparison to basic research. Since spillovers occur only through basic research, ﬁrms ﬁnd it
relatively more proﬁtable to reward those activities that, while reducing costs, do not produce
externalities (thus beneﬁting competitors). When  =0or  =0  note that neither the intensity
of competition nor the ease with which knowledge spills over to competitors has an eﬀect on the
relative strength of incentives.





,i si n c r e a s i n gi n and 
3.1.2 Knowledge spillovers and the shape of the optimal contract
In general, the eﬀect of knowledge spillovers from basic research (as measured by the parameter
) on the absolute strength of incentives is ambiguous. On the one hand, there is a positive eﬀect
of incoming spillovers. As previously noticed, larger ﬁrms have higher incentives to invest in cost-
reducing R&D. Consequently, a decrease in unit costs due to larger incoming spillovers leads ﬁrms
to provide stronger incentives both for basic and applied research. On the other hand, giving
strong incentives to scientists beneﬁts the competing ﬁrm by reducing its costs through outgoing
spillovers, thus increasing the competitor’s size and proﬁts at the detriment of the ﬁrm originating
the spillovers. This has a negative eﬀect on the provision of incentives for basic research as well as
for applied research, due to the ﬁrm’s smaller size. The overall impact of the degree of knowledge
spillovers turns out to depend crucially on the intensity of product market competition.
When the intensity of competition  is suﬃciently low, the positive eﬀect of outgoing spillovers
prevails, both 
 and 
 are increasing in ,a n dt h en e g a t i v ei m p a c to fk n o w l e d g es p i l l o v e r s
vanishes. Each ﬁrm is reinforced by the spillovers deriving from the other ﬁrm; this reinforcement,
however, does not hamper the proﬁtability of the originating ﬁrms since there is limited direct
interaction in the ﬁnal market. As a consequence, ﬁrms exploit the cost-reducing impact of knowl-
edge spillovers in full, by reinforcing the incentives to their scientists. At the other extreme, when






 are both negative. Low investments in basic research lead
ﬁrms to operate at higher costs, which is detrimental to the incentives for cost-reduction through
applied research eﬀorts. Finally, in the intermediate case, there is a "substitution eﬀect" that favors
12applied research against basic research following from Proposition 3.1 above: ﬁrms provide higher
incentives for applied research, which does not generate spillovers to competitors, while reducing
the incentives for basic research for which spillovers to competitors are present. This leads to


  0 and


  0. The previous considerations are formalized in the following propositions and
corollaries:
Proposition 3.2 
 is increasing in  if  ∗
,w h e r e∗





 is decreasing in 
Corollary 3.2.1 




 is increasing in  if  ∗
,w h e r e∗









 is always decreasing in  if 2
3 or 1
2







 in the () space, while the other parameters are chosen in order to guarantee that the
second order conditions are satisﬁed for all values of  and .
3.1.3 Competition and the shape of the optimal contract
We now investigate the relationship between the strength of incentives provided to scientists and
the intensity of competition as measured by . This analysis evokes the issue of the relationship
between the intensity of competition and the incentives to innovate, which has been long debated
in economics since Schumpeter (1943) and Arrow (1962). Again, the interaction between degree of
knowledge spillovers and competition comes to play a key role.
There are two eﬀects relating  and the incentives to research. If  is small, so that competition
is limited, ﬁrms are larger, ceteris paribus. This provides high incentives for cost-reduction (such
an eﬀect can be seen in the denominator of (9), page 10). If  is large, a ﬁrm’s proﬁts are more
sensitive to its own costs and the other ﬁrm’s cost (as can be seen from expression (9) representing
the optimal quantities produced). This tends to reduce the incentives to innovation, especially
when knowledge spillovers are high, since the marginal reduction of the other ﬁrm’s cost is higher
in this case.
The net eﬀect of these contrasting forces is as follows. The coeﬃcients 
 and 
 are decreasing
in  if 2
3, irrespective of .I f2
3, there are three diﬀerent regions. If  is suﬃciently low,
then both 
 and 
 are increasing in . This means that in this case the relationship between
the intensity of competition and the power of incentives to the scientists is U-shaped, i.e. 
 and

 are minimal for an intermediate level of 11 For intermediate values of ,a ni n c r e a s ei n has
11This result extends Sacco and Schmutzler (2009) and Belleﬂamme and Vergari (2006). Sacco and Schmutzler
(2009) consider the same duopoly model as we do, but with one-dimensional eﬀort. In Belleﬂamme and Vergari
(2006), only one ﬁrm has access to innovation. Furthermore, both models assume that innovations are always
perfectly appropriable and do not consider the eﬀects of the presence of knowledge spillovers.
13ap o s i t i v ee ﬀect on 
, but a negative eﬀect on 
 Again, a substitution eﬀect is present since
higher  particularly reinforces the negative eﬀect of spillovers on 
 when  is high. Finally, for
high values of , 
 and 
 are both decreasing in . In this case, lower investment in basic
research also leads to a reduction in applied research.12
Proposition 3.4 
 is increasing in  if  ∗∗
 where ∗∗




and is increasing in  If the critical value ∗∗
 is greater than 1, then 
 is always decreasing in .
Proposition 3.5 
 is always increasing in  if  ∗∗
 where ∗∗
 i st h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nt o


 =0 , and is increasing in  Furthermore, ∗∗
 ≤ ∗∗
 






 in the () space, using for the other
parameters the same numerical values as in Figure 2 above.
3.1.4 Are the incentive instruments complementary?
Ultimately, R&D managers are interested in the design of a whole incentive system for scientists, and
not only in the choice of each single eﬀort-enhancing measure (Cockburn et al., 1999; Holmstrom
and Milgrom, 1994). Our model also holds predictions on how the piece rates co-move, and in
particular on their complementarity. The variables 
 and 
 are said to be complementary to
a given parameter when an increase in the parameter leads to an increase in the marginal return
from 
 and 
 , and, simultaneously, the increase in the level of one of the piece rates increases








2(2−)2(2+)2  0 The analysis lead to the following ﬁndings.
Consider, ﬁrst, product market competition. The incentive instruments 
 and 
 are com-
plementary to  when product market competition is suﬃciently intense and spillovers are not too
high. When  is high and  is low, the marginal impact on proﬁts of each type of research is high,
and the eﬀects reinforce each other. Complementarity between the incentive instrument and the
level of knowledge spillovers holds also in the opposite case, i.e. when the level of competition is
low. The following two propositions formalize these results:
Proposition 3.6 
 and 






 are complementary in  if  → 0.
3.1.5 Discussion
The main insight from this ﬁrst set of results is not only that such characteristics as product market
competition and knowledge spillovers matter in the determination of incentives to scientists, but also
12These results (and their intuitions) are similar to those derived by Schmutzler (2010). His model (in which
cost-reducing investments are unidimensional) is more general than the one presented here — thus lending some
support to the robustness of our ﬁndings. The results however depend on a speciﬁc assumption that we do not make.
Schmutzler’s analysis also does not include the agency problem that we consider in our model.
14that they interact. In addition to this theoretical insight, a major implication for empirical analysis
is that the structure of the industry and the IP regimes need to be controlled for when assessing the
determinants of scientists’ pays and incentive structures. Cockburn et al. (1999), for example, ﬁnd
that incentives for basic and applied research are complementary in the pharmaceutical industry:
when ﬁr m sc o m m i tt oh i g h - p o w e r e di n c e n t i v e st oo b t a i nr e c o g n i t i o ni nt h es c i e n t i ﬁc community,
they also oﬀer higher-powered rewards for applied activities. The authors use data at the level of
research programs; arguably, diﬀerent research programs refer to diﬀerent ﬁnal product markets,
thus our model suggests an extension of the work of Cockburn et al., consisting of the estimate of
the relation between basic and applied research incentives separately for each submarket, in order
to account for potentially diﬀerent competitive and knowledge-appropriability conditions.
In a study of the wage determination of software developers, Andersson et al. (2009) ﬁnd that
wages are more responsive to performance in more "risky" industry segments, where riskiness is
measured in terms of the 90/50 ratio of product line sales per worker. The authors oﬀer a sorting
explanation for their results. Firms in highly risky environments beneﬁtm o r ef r o mh a v i n gs t a r
workers. In order to attract them, ﬁrms oﬀer a better pay, both in terms of ﬁxed and performance
related-wage. Our results point to additional (though not necessarily mutually exclusive) explana-
tions. Consider, for example, the video game software developing/publishing segment, indicated by
Andersson et al. as the riskiest in their sample. Williams (2002), moreover, reports that this seg-
ment has experienced increased concentration over the 1990s, up to a four-ﬁrm concentration ratios
greater than 50% in the early 2000s. The IT-software online journal SoftwareMag.com publishes a
list of the biggest software companies. Among the 100 biggest companies of this survey, only two
declare "Database" as their primary product line; eight indicate software for ﬁnancial applications,
and nine indicate infrastructure/networking software. Among these three segments, Andersson et
al. indicate "networking" as the riskiest, and "database" as the least risky. Therefore, some of
the riskiest segments of the industries are also those where ﬁrms are of larger size, which in our
model corresponds to lower competitive pressure. In addition, intellectual property protection in
software is relatively weak, and knowledge spillovers are pervasive.13 If higher riskiness happens
to be associated with the presence of larger ﬁrms, then our model predicts that companies oﬀer
higher powered incentives in less competitive product lines (where ﬁrms are larger).
13Graham and Mowery (2003) report that, until the early 1990s, the major form of IP protection for software was
through copyright. A series of court rulings, however, have reduced the power of copyright in preventing imitation by
rivals. In more recent years, companies have increasingly patented their software inventions. Since software patents
have been used only recently, the absence of a prior art has made it diﬃcult for examiners to assess the appropriateness
of a patent application. Besides, patent systems around the world, in a typically global industry, have shown diﬀering
degrees of severity in accepting applications. It is reasonable to conclude that patents have only a limited role in
the protection of software. Notice, also, that the majority of software patents are held by non-software companies.
Finally, job hopping is widespread in the software industry, thus allowing ideas and possibly secrets to move from
one company to another, together with people who carry these ideas (Fallick et al., 2006; Freedman, 2006).
153.2 Monetary wage and non-pecuniary beneﬁts: a trade-oﬀ?
We now move to the analysis of the relationship between the non-monetary drivers of scientiﬁc
eﬀort, such as scientiﬁc curiosity or the desire to excel in the community of peers, and a ﬁrm’s
decision of the type of incentive contract to oﬀer to scientists. In the model, the non-monetary
motives are expressed by the parameter  in the scientists’ utility function. As a direct eﬀect,
an increase in the researcher’s taste for science makes eﬀort in basic research more attractive; in
turn, through its positive eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s size, this leads the ﬁrm to increase the power of
the incentives both for basic and applied research. In other words, the ﬁrm prefers to reinforce
the non-monetary incentives through the wage schedule. This mechanism leads to the following
proposition:
Proposition 3.8 Both 
 and 
 are increasing in ; 
 ,
 and  are complementary.
T h ep r e s e n c eo fat a s t ef o rs c i e n c e has also implications for determining the ﬁxed component
of wage, 0. In the standard case, 0 is simply determined by the participation constraint, which is
binding in equilibrium. In our framework, it is interesting to study how the ﬁxed wage varies with
.T h e e ﬀect is a-priori ambiguous. Higher  implies that the scientists obtain a higher beneﬁt
from basic research. At the same time, as from Proposition 3.8, the scientists exert higher eﬀort
in both applied and basic research, for which they must be compensated. It turns out that the
ﬁrst eﬀect prevails, thus 0
 (the ﬁxed wage in equilibrium) is always decreasing in  This result
is summarized in the next proposition:
Proposition 3.9 0
 is decreasing in .




and the degree of non-monetary beneﬁts. We show that for low levels of  the expected wage is
increasing in ,i . e .t h ee ﬀect on the piece rates prevails. For high , examples both for the case in
which the expected wage is increasing and for the case in which it is decreasing in  can be found.
Proposition 3.10 The expected wage 0
+
()+ 




() m a yb ei n c r e a s i n go rd e c r e a s i n gi n when  is high.
3.2.1 Discussion
This second set of results, also, oﬀer insights to empirical research. Again, we use some existing
empirical studies to show the relevance of our ﬁndings. In a detailed study of the organization
of research in a major biotechnology company, Liu and Stuart (2010) ﬁnd that the contingent
component of scientists’ pay is positively related to the their publication performance. The positive
association is particularly strong for Ph.D. scientists, who, plausibly, are those with a higher taste
for science. Our model thus oﬀers an explanation for Liu and Stuart’s ﬁndings. Stern (2004)
16investigates whether the R&D orientation of ﬁrms leads scientists to accept lower wages. He ﬁnds
that ﬁrms that allow their researchers to publish their ﬁndings, or even reward scientists for their
publications, oﬀer lower monetary wages. Stern concludes that researchers show a taste for science.
The model in this paper is in line with this claim as it includes, through the parameter ,n o n -
pecuniary beneﬁts for company scientists when they engage in basic science. We show a negative
relation between the taste for science and the ﬁxed component of wage, but a positive relationship
with piece rates. Furthermore, we show that the overall expected wage is increasing in  when 
is not too high. Using Stern’s terminology, we can claim that a "productivity eﬀect" acts at the
level of the performance-based component of wage, while a "preference eﬀect," i.e. the willingness
of a science-oriented researcher to give up money in exchange for science, acts on the ﬁxed salary
(which is what Stern is able to observe).
In addition to providing novel theoretical insights and to interpreting empirical ﬁndings, the
model also has a number of implications for managers and entrepreneurs as well as for policymakers.
These further insights are discussed in the following Section.
4 Managerial and policy implications: R&D organization and be-
yond
Providing incentives to corporate scientists is a complex problem that requires to consider the nature
of the knowledge that scientists are expected to generate, the monetary and intrinsic motivations
of researchers, and the competitive conditions in the markets where a ﬁrm operates. If a company
is positioned so as to enjoy market power, cost-reducing eﬀorts by its scientists are likely to have
a sizeable impact on the level of proﬁts. When competition is more intense, cost reduction might
instead be crucial for survival, thus again leading ﬁrms to provide stronger incentives to scientists for
process innovations. The latter case, however, depends also on the degree to which the knowledge
produced by a ﬁrms’s scientists spills over to rivals. If these spillovers are high, then incentivizing
scientists too strongly results in oﬀering an advantage to rivals. In an environment where knowledge
ﬂows easily, managers and entrepreneurs should be aware that the organizational responses to
market competition may be diﬀerent than in a world of more "private" knowledge. Conversely,
the level of knowledge appropriability has a diﬀerent impact in highly and weakly competitive
markets. In the former type of markets, as said, low appropriability may oﬀer an advantage to
competitors which, in turn, backﬁres on the focal company. When competition on the product
market is low, by contrast, each ﬁrm is reinforced by the spillovers deriving from the other ﬁrm;
this reinforcement, however, does not aﬀect the proﬁtability of the originating ﬁrms, since there is
limited direct interaction in the ﬁnal market. Finally, scientists who are more eager to maintain
their links to the scientiﬁc community even when employed by a ﬁrm, and are allowed by a ﬁrm to
do so, are not necessarily "cheap," since it may be optimal for a ﬁrm to provide them with more
powerful incentives and higher expected wages.
17The above considerations are useful also to analyze how organizations motivate other types of
workers. Just as in the case of ﬁrms dealing with researchers, such issues as competitive pressure,
leakage of relevant information, multidimensional eﬀort and multiple motivations are going to be
of relevance for other professions within companies, and for other organizations. Examples include
such industries as health care and advertising (Gaynor et al., 2005; Von Nordenﬂycht, 2007), and
such organizations as universities, hospitals, and the military.
A further application of the model is in the policy debate, with particular reference to the
two major instruments in industrial policy: competition and intellectual property (IP) policy.
Our analysis implies that IP protection rules should be determined in relation to the level of
competition of each industry and that, in particular, antitrust legislation and IP protection are
complementary instruments. When companies face low competition on the ﬁnal market, they have
"nothing to fear" from low knowledge appropriability; instead, they ﬁnd it even more proﬁtable
to motivate the performance of basic (open) research by their scientists. Conversely, in industries
where IP protection is very strong, competition on the product market should be particularly
favored. Ganslandt (2007) shows that, in fact, there is a strong positive correlation, across countries,
between strength of IP protection and eﬀectiveness of antitrust regulations.
5 Summary and directions for future research
The model of incentive provision to company scientists developed in this paper is based on four
key characteristics of research activities. First, scientists engage in multiple, diﬀerent activities
when performing research, e.g. in (proprietary) applied and (open) basic research. Second, the
knowledge produced through research activities is not perfectly appropriable. Third, scientists are
responsive both to monetary incentives and to non-material motives, such as their reputation in
the community of peers. Fourth, the provision of incentives depends on the conditions a ﬁrm faces
in the product market, such as the intensity of competition.
We show that the strength of incentives for applied and basic research depends on the interac-
tion of intensity of competition and degree of knowledge spillovers. Greater knowledge spillovers
positively aﬀect the provision of incentives only when competition is low, whereas in more competi-
tive environments, the impact of higher knowledge spillovers on the incentive scheme is ambiguous.
The relationship between the intensity of competition and the power of incentives to scientists is
in general U-shaped, with the exact shape and slopes, again, crucially depending on the intensity
of spillovers. An implication of these ﬁndings is that incentives for basic and applied research
are complementary only if either competition or knowledge spillovers are low. We also show that
the incentives for both applied and basic research increase with the non-pecuniary beneﬁts that
scientists obtain from basic research, while a trade-oﬀ between monetary pay and non-monetary
rewards can occur at the level of the ﬁxed salary.
Empirical studies of the determinants of incentives to scientists need to account for such environ-
18mental conditions as the degree of product market competition and of appropriability of knowledge,
and need to analyze separately diﬀerent components of wages, e.g. ﬁxed and contingent pays, since
they might respond diﬀerently to certain changes. Similarly, ﬁrms need to look at their position
in the product market, and at the knowledge appropriability conditions for diﬀerent types of ac-
tivities, when designing their internal R&D organization. Managers should also account for the
non-monetary motivations of scientists. The model in this paper, ﬁnally, implies that policymakers
should see antitrust and IP legislation as related (and complementary) measures.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. A richer setup would
consider ﬁrms diﬀering in their focus on, or their eﬃciency in, diﬀerent types of research, as well
as scientists diﬀering in their abilities and motivations. A further related extension would be to
model the interaction between the incentive provision problem and the labor market for scientists.
The incentive schemes would be devised so as to equalize returns across ﬁrms, and if ﬁrms and
scientists are heterogeneous, matching dynamics would also be relevant (Besley and Ghatak, 2005).
Furthermore, scientists also have the opportunity to work in academia, and presumably the value
of this "outside option" is aﬀected by their taste for science (Roach and Sauermann, 2010). The
model, ﬁnally, focuses on competition among ﬁrms. Further developments would also explore how
the incentive provision problem changes when ﬁrms cooperate in R&D.14 In turn, the comparison
between competitive and cooperative outcomes is a natural step in the analysis of the welfare
consequences in addition to some of the conjectures made in the paper.
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23AN o t a t i o n a n d ﬁgures
Players
  Subscripts indicating, respectively, ﬁrm i and ﬁrm j,a sw e l la s




 Wage coeﬃcient related to the performance
measures X and X (see below), chosen by the ﬁrms
0
 Fixed component of the scientists’ wage, chosen by the ﬁrms

  
 Eﬀort levels in applied and basic research, respectively,
chosen by the scientists
 Product quantity level, chosen by the ﬁrms
Payoﬀs parameters
Π Π Firms’ proﬁts
 Scientist’s wage
 Scientists’ non monetary beneﬁts per unit of basic research eﬀort
 Eﬀort cost parameter

  
 Performance measures for applied and basic eﬀort, respectively,
used by the ﬁrms to determine the scientists’ wage
 Marginal cost of production
 Fixed component of the marginal cost function
 ∈ [01] Degree with which scientist j’s basic research eﬀort reduces the
marginal cost of ﬁrm i (indicator of the intensity of knowledge spillovers)
Demand parameters
 Product price
 Maximum willingness to pay by consumers
 ∈ [01] Degree of substitutability between the products of the two ﬁrms
(indicator of competitive pressure)
Table 1: Summary of the notation used in the model. The choice variables and parameters are
reported only for ﬁrm i, for simplicity.
24Figure 1: The game’s timeline
Figure 2: The impact of knowledge spillovers on the strength of incentives, for diﬀerent combinations of
knowledge spillovers and product market competition intensities. The examples are built using the following
values:  =2 ; =1 ,  =1 5,  = 2
25Figure 3: The impact of competitive pressure on the strength of incentives, for diﬀerent combinations of
knowledge spillovers and product market competition intensities. The examples are built using the following
values:  =2 ; =1 ,  =1 5,  = 2
BP r o o f s
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . 1 Substituting the constraints (11) and (12) and the proﬁts Π as expressed



























































































We assume that the second order conditions are satisﬁed.17 Solving the system of ﬁrst order conditions and
15We shall assume that 1 to guarantee that (14) and (15) are always positive. Furthemore, in order to simplify
the proof of one proposition below, we shall assume  −  ≥ 
16In equilibrium, 

















































26deﬁning  ≡ ( +2 ) 2(2 − ),w eo b t a i n
 and 
 as deﬁned in (14) and (15) The ﬁxed component of
wage 0 is set so as teh scientists obtain their reservation utility 








Proof of Proposition 3.2 and Corollary 3.2.1 If we diﬀerentiate 





4[− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )] + 8[(−)+(1 + )][2 − 2− ]
[− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )]
2 
Notice that [− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )]  0 (since it is the denominator of
), while 8[(−)+(1 + )]
∗(2 − 2− ) is positive if 2 − 2− 0. It follows that, if  2
1+2,t h e n


  0,f r o mw h i c h
the Corollary is obtained.
We now investigate the behavior of


 as a function of .F o r =0we know that











{4[( +2 ) ( 2− 3) − 2(1 + 2)]−8( − )(1 + 2)}∗




8[(−)](2 − 2− )+4
h
− 4 − 2(1 + )
2
io
∗2[− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )]
[( +2 ) ( 2− 3)+2 ( 1+)]
[− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )]
4 .
Overall the sign is ambiguous, since the three quantities
4[( +2 ) ( 2− 3) − 2(1 + 2)]−8( − )(1 + 2)
8[( − )](2 − 2− )+4 
h




[( +2 ) ( 2− 3)+2 ( 1+)]
all have ambiguous signs. However, when


 =0 , the sign of


 is the sign of:
{4[( + 2)(2 − 3) − 2(1 + 2)] − 8( − )(1 + 2)} (19)
Expression (19) is negative for  ≤ 2
3, which is a necessary condition to have


 =0 . This implies that




  0 when  =0  this implies that the value of  for which


 =0is unique, if it exists. Then,
there are two possible cases: i)






positive. The ﬁrst part of the Proposition follows from this.
27Deﬁne now ∗
 a st h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nt o


 =0  In order to show that ∗
 is decreasing in ,w ec a n
apply the implicit function theorem. Consider:
()=3 2[ (−)](2 − 2− )+1 6 
h




the solution of ()=0is the set of values for which


 =0  Denote with (∗
∗
) a solution pair.










































8[(−)](2 − 2− )+4
h
− 4 − 2(1 + )
2
io
∗2[− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )]
[2(2 − 2− )]










which the second part of the Proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.3 and Corollary 3.3.1 Diﬀerentiating 





{2(2 − ) − 2[( − )+(1 + )]}[− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )]
+4[(−)+(1 + )](2 − 2− )(2− )
[− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )]
2  (20)




  0. To see this, notice
that {2(2 − ) − 2[( − )+(1 + )]} is equal to
−−(−)−(1+)
1+2  0 for  = 2
1+2 and




 is the sum of two negative quantities, the
Corollary follows.
We study now the behavior of


 as a function of  For  =0  we have









2[(−2 − 1)(− 4) + (2 − 2− )( +2 ) ( 2− 3)]
−2( − )[− 4+( +2 ) ( 2− 3)+4 (2 − )]
¾
∗
[− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )]
2
−2(2 − 2− )(− 4) − 2( − )
h




2[− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )]∗
[( +2 ) ( 2− 3)+2 ( 1+)]
[− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )]
4  (21)






 =0 .I nt h i sc a s e ,t h es i g no f


 is the sign of:
½
2[(−2 − 1)(− 4) + (2 − 2− )( +2 ) ( 2− 3)]
−2( − )[− 4+( +2 ) ( 2− 3)+4 (2 − )]
¾
 (22)
Notice, from above considerations, that in order to have


 =0 ,i tm u s tb e(2 − 2− )  0.T h e n
if (2 − 3)  0, the above quantity is negative, and the proof is given. Assume instead that (2 − 3)  0
and that [(−2 − 1)(− 4) + (2 − 2− )( + 2)(2 − 3)] 0 (which would otherwise imply that
(22) is negative). By assumption,  −  ≥ .T h u s ,i f
 [− 4+( +2 ) ( 2− 3)+4 (2 − )]  (−2 − 1)(− 4) + (2 − 2− )( +2 ) ( 2− 3)
then we proved our result. Simplifying the expression, we obtain:
( +1+2 )(− 4) − ( +2 ) ( 2− 3)(2 − 2)+4 (2 − )  0 (23)
We note the following. ( +1+2 ) is increasing in . (− 4) is increasing in when 2
3. ( +2 ) ( 2− 3)(2 − 2) 
is decreasing in  since
(+2)(2−3)
 =2− 3 − 3 − 6  0, and is decreasing in  Finally,
4(2−)
 =
(2 − 2)  0,s i n c e(2 − 2− )  0 This implies that if (23) is positive for  =  =0 , then our







 =0 . This means that, in any point in which the derivative is 0, the
graph cuts "from above" the horizontal axis. In turn, together with


  0 in  =0  this implies that the
value of  for which


 =0is unique, if existing. Then, there are two possible cases: i)


 is ﬁrst positive
a n dt h e nn e g a t i v ew i t hr e s p e c tt o; ii)


 is always positive. The ﬁrst part of the Proposition follows.
Deﬁne ∗
 as the unique solution to


 =0  In order to show that ∗
 is decreasing in , we can apply,
again, the implicit function theorem. Consider:
()=2 (2 − 2− )(− 4) − 2( − )
h




the solution of ()=0is the set of values for which


 =0  Denote with (
∗
∗
) a solution pair.








































[−4(− 4) − 4( − )(2 − )][− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )]
2 + h




2(− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − ))(2(2 − 2− ))





 =0 , then the sign of
2

2 is the sign of [−4(− 4) − 4( − )(2 − )],w h i c hi sa l -
ways negative. The second part of the Proposition follows. Finally, to show that ∗
≤ ∗
 note that for
2 − 2−  =0 ,







  0 which implies ∗
  2
1+2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 4 Diﬀerentiating 





4[(−)+(1 + )][( + 2)(2 − 3)+2 ( 1+)]
[− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )]
2  (26)
which has the same sign as − [( +2 ) ( 2− 3)+2 ( 1+)].C o n s e q u e n t l y , w e h a v e









  It is immediate to verify that ∗∗
 is increasing in  Notice that it also pos-




 −2  3, i.e.,  2
3(1 + )
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 5 Diﬀerentiating 







− [− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )]
−(2 − )[( +2 ) ( 2− 3)+2 ( 1+)]
¾
[− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )]
2  (27)





8[( − )+(1 + )]{− (− 4) − (2 − )( + 2)(2 − 3)}
[− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )]
2  (28)
We study now the sign of


 as a function of  From (28), we have














[−(2 − )(−4 − 6)][− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )]
2 −
[−(− 4) − (2 − )( +2 ) ( 2− 3)]∗










 =0  the sign of
2

2 is the sign of −(2 − )(−4 − 6),t h e n
2

2  0. Then, in any point




 =0is unique, if existing. Then, there are two possible cases: i)






 =0is always negative. The ﬁr s tp a r to fP r o p o s i t i o nf o l l o w s .
In order to show that ∗∗
 is increasing in , the implicit function theorem is applied again. Consider:
()={− (− 4)−(2 − )( + 2)(2 − 3)};
the solution of ()=0is the set of values for which


 =0 . Denote with (
∗∗
 ∗∗
 ) as o l u t i o n







































2[(−)+(1 + )][−+ ( +2 ) ( 2− 3)]
+2[−(− 4) − (2 − )( +2 ) ( 2− 3)]
¾
∗
[− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )]
2 +
+2[(−)+(1 + )]{[−(− 4) − (2 − )( + 2)(2 − 3)]}∗
2[− 4 − 2(1 + )(2 − )]∗2(2 − 2− )





 =0 , the sign of


 is the sign of [−+ ( +2 ) ( 2− 3)] After some manipulations we
obtain:
[−+ ( + 2)(2 − 3)] = −( + 2)(4 − 4
2+2)  0
from which the Proposition follows.
Finally, in order to show that ∗∗
 ≤ ∗∗
  we show that, if


  0,t h e n


  0which in turn implies
the claim. In fact, if








 when  =0 
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 6 If we compute the cross-derivatives of the total surplus function TS with









































(+2) . Then, supermodularity holds if:
22 − 
h
4( − ) − 
2
i
 (2 − )(2 − )
The ﬁrst inequality is satisﬁed if  2
3. As for the second inequality, we deﬁne:
()=4 (  − ) − 




=4 − 2 + (2 − )+( 2− )  0;












   0 when   (),w i t h() ≥2
3 and
()
  0. Since this condition is stricter than  2
3,
we can derive the claim.




























For  → 0 (32) is positive, so that we have the claim.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 8 The proof is immediate by inspection of the expressions (14) and (15), since 


































































































 is increasing in  since all its terms are increasing in .A s a
consequence, 0
,t h eﬁxed component of wage, is decreasing in  in order for () to be constant.








2 Diﬀerentiating with respect to
















,w h i c hi sp o s i t i v ef o r → 0 An example for which
()
 is always
increasing in  is  =2 =1 =1  =0 5 =1 5=0from which we get
()
 =1 5+0 833 An
example for which
()
 is decreasing in  for high  is  =2 =1 =0 2=0 5=5 =0from
which we get
()
 =0 0398 − 0188
33